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Taming the beast of uncertainty has been the grand project to which actuaries have dedicated much 
of their energy and skill over at least the last 50 years – roughly the time since, iŶ HaŶs BühlŵaŶŶ͛s 
(1989) famous term, ͚Actuaries of the Second Kind͛ emerged. The collective efforts of actuarial 
researchers and practitioners have been founded on two premises: 
- First Premise: Uncertainty is malleable; responsive to quantification skills and management 
expertise. Yes, actuaries concede, models sometimes fail, as seen in the case of the 2007-9 
financial crisis. But, the world is orderly enough, such that one need not despair: the answer 
lies in using better, more sophisticated models, which will provide a better approximation to 
the risk environment.  
- Second Premise: We can neatly separate the quantification of uncertainty – by probabilistic 
and statistical tools – from the economically motivated (and often normative) principles 
according to which decisions are taken. Disagreements about the accuracy of quantitative 
models are distinct from disagreements on how decisions should be taken. Maximising the 
Return on Capital for a portfolio is one thing; deciding that such a measure of performance 
should, in fact, be used in portfolio management is quite another.  
The big task of taming uncertainty is thus broken down into two smaller tasks: first, to develop a 
statistical/stochastic model according to the best science we have access to; then, to consider how 
that model is used to take decisions such as pricing liabilities, setting capital requirements or 
optimising portfolios.  
Such a conventional separation also leads to a rather neat definition of model risk: the risk arising 
from feeding the outputs of a flawed model to the (presumed correct) decision principle, thus 
leading to poor decisions. ͞Flaǁed͟ here refers to proďleŵs of ŵodel ŵis-specification, as well as 
inappropriate use (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011). (In fact, these two 
sources of model risk are hardly distinct: since we have no access to some true model of nature, 
appropriateness of a model can only ever be understood with reference to specific uses and 
applications.) But if there is agreement on decision principles, implying that, equipped with some 
ideally correct model we could perfectly manage risk, then all remaining risk must be model risk – 
there is nothing else.  Thus, our concerns about the state of the world transmute into concerns 
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about the state of our knowledge. The purported taming of uncertainty does not make risk 
disappear; it merely sublimates it into the epistemic domain. 
Work under those two premises has led to a flourishing of the actuarial literature. One could talk in 
fact about a bifurcation along the lines discussed above. On the one hand, we have the great 
achievements in the domain of modelling, e.g. stochastic claims reserving, longevity models, and 
extreme value theory, while, on the other, we have the elegant contributions to decision making, 
e.g. risk measure theory, market consistent valuation, and optimal risk transfers. At the same time, 
we argue here, each of the two premises is flawed. In particular, the very conception of uncertainty, 
as encoded in those two premises, is too limited to reflect the complex financial world that actuaries 
have to navigate.  
To start with, we need to talk about uncertainties, plural. We are all conscious of the distinction 
between risk, for which possible outcomes and probabilities are well specified and known, and 
uncertainty, where such knowledge is not given. The latter can itself be split into two kinds: on the 
one hand, epistemological uncertainty, reflecting difficulties in quantification due to the complexity 
of the problem at hand and the lack of sufficient data; on the other, ontological uncertainty, 
reflecting the possible existence of states and eventualities, of which decision makers are as yet 
unaware. Ontological uncertainty often arises from structural breaks, caused by changes in the 
environment (e.g. climate change) or radical innovation and changing market practices (Lane and 
Maxfield, 2005).  
But there is also a fourth kind of uncertainty, generally not acknowledged in the actuarial or 
economics literatures, but studied comprehensively by anthropologists and political scientists
5
. 
Imagine a game of dice. Agents focused on risk will take the odds of different outcomes as given and 
focus on how to take optimal decisions. Those considering epistemological uncertainty will argue 
about the validity of the estimated odds (what if the six sides of a die are not equiprobable?), while 
those worried about ontological uncertainty will point to the limits of quantification (what if the dice 
are actually dodecahedra instead of cubes?). But there will also be some who articulate a very 
different objection to attempts at quantifying uncertainty: those who believe that the dice are fixed 
or that their counterparty is unlikely to pay up in any case
6
. For such agents, called cynics or fatalists 
by anthropologists, models are answering an irrelevant question; hence concern about their validity 
is misplaced. We call the uncertainty that this view represents, framing uncertainty, as it represents 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal douďt aďout the ͚rules of the game͛. The rational response to such uncertainty is 
manipulation, blame-shedding and a focus on the short term.  
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It is apparent that while risk and epistemological uncertainty are both malleable, that is, amenable 
to probabilistic modelling (though for the latter a Bayesian interpretation may be necessary), 
ontological and framing uncertainties do not lend themselves to such modelling. Hence they are not 
natural domains for the application of conventional actuarial skills. 
A careful look at the role of risk models in the 2007-9 financial crisis reveals all those four kinds of 
uncertainty in play. It has been argued that the crisis revealed an intellectual failure of a 
monocultural economics and modelling, which focused exclusively on risk, ignoring epistemological 
and ontological uncertainties (Bronk, 2011).  The use of Gaussian copulas in credit risk management 
is an instructive example (Donnelly and Embrechts, 2010): the emphasis on calculating default 
probability of a credit derivative like a CDO (risk) came at the cost of using models that were too 
simple, internally inconsistent, and did not capture tail dependencies appropriately (epistemological 
uncertainty). Such disregard of uncertainty was not because of naivety on behalf of modellers, who 
were perfectly aware of the limitations of the Gaussian copula model. Operational factors, such as 
the need for a clear way to book P&L and thus set bonuses, provided the organisational context in 
which the Gaussian copula model became indispensable (MacKenzie and Spears, 2014). 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of model outputs to assumptions that could in practice never be 
validated using historical data, given the context of a young market with complex products and 
transaction patterns, was not fully considered (ontological uncertainty). One could say: the problem 
ǁas Ŷot that ŵodels ǁere ͚wrong͛, but that theǇ Đould Ŷeǀer ďe eǀeŶ Đlose to ͚right͛ (and that 
people chose to ignore this). Maybe most importantly, there was also a fundamental indifference to 
the accuracy of the models used (framing uncertainty), infamously captured by the comment of 
ratiŶg ageŶĐǇ staff that a produĐt ͞Đould ďe struĐtured ďǇ Đoǁs aŶd ǁe ǁould rate it͟ (Jones, 2008).  
Returning to the First Premise, we would argue that the work of actuaries is rooted in the interplay 
between risk and epistemological uncertainty. Turning the latter into the former may have once 
been our aim: resolving uncertainty through quantification. The recent literature on model 
uncertainty is more sceptical about such aims, with explicit acknowledgment of statistical 
considerations (concerns of epistemological uncertainty) when formulating decision criteria 
(responses to risk), but still sees uncertainty in primarily technical terms; indicatively we mention 
Cairns (2000), Cont et al. (2010), Ziegel (2014) Bignozzi and Tsanakas (2015), Barrieu and Scandolo 
(2015) in the context of risk measurement. But ontological and framing uncertainties remain 
ignored. When actuaries ignore such uncertainties in their practice, it does not follow that they are 
oblivious to them. Rather, actuarial scientists are to varying extents conscious that paying too much 
attention to ontological and framing uncertainties would undermine the First Premise, and thus, the 
ability to impose enough mathematical structure on the world, such that modelling work can 
continue and lead to ever deeper understanding. Quantitative scientists may feel that they must 
downplay such uncertainties, in order to fulfil their professional and scientific identities.  
This last point demonstrates another way in which anthropological theories of risk help us, beyond 
completing a classification of uncertainty types. The example of dice, while helpful as an illustration, 
is rather reductive, not least because it confines all considerations of human nature to one kind of 
uncertainty. Rather than attempting precise definitions of those uncertainty types, we find it more 
interesting to ask how diverse conceptions of uncertainty (and concern for those) are generated. 
They neither arise in a vacuum nor can they be reduced to the psychological profiles of individuals. 
Instead, alternative conceptions of uncertainty are closely bound up with ways of organising social 
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and economic relations (Thompson et al., 1990). Thus, in the world of insurance risk management, 
focusing on reliably quantified risks allows speedy and efficient decision making. Acknowledging the 
prevalence of epistemological uncertainty necessitates more sophisticated quantification 
approaches and establishes the demand for highly qualified professionals (͞people like us͟). Concern 
for ontological uncertainties generates risk management that is both prudent and imaginative, 
employing scenario analyses, for example, and giving credence to the worries of emerging risk 
committees. Finally, framing uncertainty recognises that the game of insurance is often played at a 
different level, beyond the considerations of modellers.  
If the ways in which we conceive and respond to uncertainty are at the same time causes and 
consequences of our differing ways of acting in the presence of uncertainty, then the Second 
Premise loses its plausibility: disagreements about the validity of statistical models and about the 
appropriateness of different decision mechanisms are not separable. When a decision maker applies 
pressure to a ŵodeller to Đoŵe up ǁith figures that are ͞ĐoŵŵerĐiallǇ ŵeaŶiŶgful͟, she is Ŷot 
challenging the technical validity of the model: she is merely asserting her own beliefs about what is 
a legitimate way of running an insurance business. When actuaries are asked by management to 
produce models that are accurate, detailed, and do not take days to run, this does not reflect 
naivety: it just manifests the need for decisions to be taken, today. And when a statistician 
vigorously protests against the practice of setting capital requirements using extreme percentiles, 
given the scarcity of relevant data (as is the case with Solvency II), he does not only make a statistical 
point: he is engaged in a battle to preserve his professional integrity. 
A recent Working Party of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, to which the authors of this 
editorial contributed, was tasked to investigate the problem of model risk. In its report, the Working 
Party on Model Risk (2015) argued that four distinct conceptions of quantitative models and their 
legitimate use exist, which can be seen as responses to the four types of uncertainty discussed here. 
Furthermore, all such conceptions of models are necessary in risk management; at the same time, 
each is bound to lead to failure, if it becomes dominant within an organisation (see Tsanakas et al. 
(2014) for a brief summary). Focusing on risk and ignoring other forms of uncertainty leads to the 
illusion that uncertainty is tamed and to decision-ŵakers͛ oǀerĐoŶfideŶĐe. An excessive emphasis on 
epistemological uncertainty can lead to endless elaboration, while missing possible flaws in the 
paradigm itself that is required for such elaboration to take place. Concern for ontological 
uncertainty, while enabling ͚thiŶkiŶg outside the box͛, can stifle innovation. Allowing the cynicism 
engendered by framing uncertainty to dominate, induces loss of accountability and blindness to 
useful evidence that models can provide.  
In fact, managing (model) risk requires governance that explicitly acknowledges the presence of all 
four kinds of uncertainty and thus legitimises the diverse (non-)modelling practices of agents driven 
by conflicting conceptions of uncertainty and of quantitative models. Actuaries, while troubled by 
such relativism, have much to gain from it: investment in their models (in return for providing 
detailed management information); big-picture challenge (in return for accepting the limitations of 
their discipline); management accountability (in return for accepting commercial constraints).   
So what sort of Actuary does this require – of the Fourth ;D͛ArĐǇ, ϮϬϬϱͿ or maybe some Fifth Kind? 
We think this is partly a misplaced question. Of course actuaries must accept as legitimate the 
concerns of the different professionals with whom they work. But practitioners do not need us to 
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tell them to find ways of aligning their interests with those of others within their organisations, in 
order to get their jobs done. Such awareness is nothing new and does not conflict with an actuarial 
professional identity. ;AŶǇ iŶstiŶĐtiǀe deŵoĐrat kŶoǁs that it is Ŷot true that ͞hell is other people͟; 
hell is too many people like us.) The challenge is primarily for institutions to foster and manage this 
diversity of uncertainty perceptions. In order to contribute to such diversity – and hold their own in 
the face of conflicting pressures that include the post-2008 backlash against mathematical risk 
models (prominently, Turner (2009)) – actuarial practitioners and researchers need to maintain a 
strong identity, based on technical excellence and professional integrity. This identity can only be 
further strengthened by exposure to a wider body of knowledge, including the anthropological 
approach to uncertainty discussed here. 
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